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INTRODUCTION
Substantial effort has been dedicated to understanding the different cultural and intellectual traditions that, for better or for worse, have infused international law with its contemporary character, and much faith is placed in the capacity for legal texts precisely to reflect human conceptual intention. Yet, the relationship between language and international law, unlike in many of the social sciences and humanities, has rarely formed the subject of thorough study. 1 Instead, most research focuses on how legal language can channel norms and values into human behaviour and on problems such as the plurilingual interpretation of treaties. European Journal of International Law, originally publishing in both French and English, explains: ‗the decision to publish exclusively in English is based on the fact that it enables us to reach the widest possible readership, in view of the ever-growing number of Europeans and others for whom English is the principal second language.' 4 More recently, the French and German Societies of International Law published the proceedings of a colloquium jointly held in Nice, which focused on cultural diversity and international law. The francophone participants presented in French; everyone else, including native German-speakers, presented in English.
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This phenomenon has significant repercussions for international law, however. It cannot be said that the impact of any change to the current linguistic settlement would not be limited to increasing the universalism of international law; it would in fact engender several concerns, three of which merit mention.
First, language does not merely reflect patterns of usage based on economic, political, or social trends, especially in a discipline with the universalist aspirations of international law. The language used by an individual carries the full weight of national traditions, of intellectual histories, and of differing cultural interpretations. Moreover, the interpretation of legal texts rests on epistemic and semantic factors, which requires the translation of a legal idea into language. 6 Sometimes the drafting of the legislative or judicial text rests upon the verbalisation of legal concepts that previously had no linguistic expression. Although there is a careful drafting process whereby differing viewpoints are reconciled, international legal processes do not begin and end with the creation of law, but rather, with its interpretation, and it is here where an entirely different facet of the complex relationship between languages 2006), which came out in French first. However, an English version had just been finalised by Oxford University Press as this study went to press. 4 www.ejil.org/about/index.php. 5 At that conference where the presentation leading to this study was delivered, 51 of the 59 panellists presented in English; eight presented in French.
6 R MacDonald, ‗Legal Bilingualism', (1997) and international law come to the fore. International law, as a forum for the meeting of people from all corners of the globe, must accommodate all of these various phenomena. 7 Second, specifically with regard to francophone legal thought, it has formed an integral part of the development of international law and structured around a civil law tradition shared with much of the globe. To eliminate any and all use of French would gradually divorce international law from an essential part of its heritage. This is not nostalgia:
much like the transition from the Arabic script to the Latin alphabet precluded younger generations of Turkish-speakers from reading the work of their progenitors without translation, so the elimination of French from international legal discourse constitutes a shift, the consequences of which are already being felt. Official marginalisation would only accelerate this tendency.
Third, it behoves international society carefully to consider the loss of the pluralist safeguard which multiple languages provide. Multilingualism reduces the temptation of many domestic lawyers to transpose domestic legal principles from their own national legal system. Thus, the substitution or addition of international languages alongside English and French, such as Spanish, Arabic or Chinese, has been suggested. However, much like adding additional members to the Security Council, substitution or addition raise a whole series of issues, which obfuscate the problems with the contemporary arrangement: instead of increasing access to the international legal process to as many participants as possible, it elevates only certain groups and in fact increases the hurdles for others. This reality has the opposite effect of any intended reform, as the challenge remains to re-conceptualise existing structures so as to make them more democratic, as opposed to simply updating international law to better reflect contemporary power structures.
International law, by its very nature, requires the interaction of people educated in different legal traditions, hence the importance of language in that framework. international law and the role of law more generally, makes an important contribution to debates concerning the role and function of international law. For this reason, this study will focus on a relatively narrow aspect of the field, namely the languages of international adjudication and legislation, and, when pertinent, the question of languages in the international adjudicative process. It is here that treaty interpretation, as a matter of law and not as a matter of obligations, takes place; it is here that a disproportionate share of the development of the law occurs; and it is here that the specific question of how legal cultures transpose their principles and approaches to the international legal plane arises. This study should therefore be read purely as a response to the movement towards English as a lingua franca of international law.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A brief history on the emergence of diplomatic languages is in order. As is well known, Latin was the original diplomatic language in the West, even used orally during the Congress of Westphalia, although by that point French had made inroads and was the second language for oral communication. 9 By the Congress of Nijmegen,
[L]'on s'aperçut du progrès que la langue française avait fait dans les pays étrangers, car il n'y avait point de maison d'ambassadeurs où elle ne fut presque aussi commune que leur langue naturelle. … pendant tout le cours des négociations de la paix, il ne parut presque que des écritures françaises, les étrangers aimant mieux s'expliquer en français dans leurs mémoires publics que d'écrire dans une langue moins usitée que le français.
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The language of diplomacy had shifted earlier than the language of treaties, which until the eighteenth century remained-with some exceptions-Latin, when French became système dans un ensemble, et qui déterminent la place du système juridique dans la culture de la société Balfour explained the reasoning for having both languages in the following terms:
English and French corresponded with two great legal traditions, one of which was founded on Roman law and the other upon the English Common Law … A great part of the world today employed the English language or made use of English in its foreign relations.
would be impossible to allow parties to come before the judges and use a language that they, the judges, did not understand. A Court composed of all the nations of the World would thus become a Court of all tongues.
24
The work of the Committee was almost exclusively in French, as can be seen in the preface to the PCIJ procès-verbaux: ‗As all the members of the Committee, with the exception of Mr.
Elihu Root, spoke in the French language, the English text of the procès-verbaux is to be looked upon as a translation, except in so far as concerns the speeches and remarks of Mr.
Root.' 25 However, before the League Council, Lord Balfour forcefully objected to this proposed unilingualism:
I do not think that this, quite apart from the merits of the case, could be accepted until America joined the League, and had an opportunity of officially expressing her opinion on the subject. Apart from American opinion, it has to be observed that the Treaty of Versailles puts the two languages on an equality; and that in every instrument issuing out of the Treaty of Versailles this equality is maintained. The League of Nations itself carries on its business in French and English; and the English is not regarded as a mere translation of the French, but is treated as of equal authority. It would seem unfortunate to make an exception in respect to the Permanent Court; and I have no doubt that my Government would regard any such exception with the greatest disfavour. 27 League, Documents, ibid 42; League Council, 10th session, 20-21. When this proposal was adopted, it was stipulated that, to avoid problems of linguistic concordance, the Court should specify which linguistic version would be authoritative, ibid 44-45.
28 MO Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice (1920 -1942 (New York, Garland Publishing, 1972) 196 . A proposal by Spain that a language expressly consented to by both parties should be accepted in a given case was rejected for the reason that it would be unfair to demand that judges master more than the two official languages: 47 Kohen's appraisal of the situation is succinct and briefly touches upon some of the major questions:
The choice of two languages instead of one for a Court of such an international characterbeing as it is, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations -must also be commended. The fact that those languages are French and English and not others is justified on the basis of tradition, their use as international languages and their recognition as representatives of two different linguistic groups. It was also a wise decision not to recognize other languages used within the UN system as official languages of the Court. This would have required extensive translations from, and into, different languages and would have complicated effective judicial action.
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The approach ultimately adopted by the drafters of the ICJ Statute has broadly been followed by other major international courts, tribunals, and dispute-settlement bodies. 
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For these reasons, the choice of language to employ in legal instruments and even in adjudicatory proceedings has a profound influence on the development of that law: these go far beyond problems of interpretation and precision, but goes straight into the heart of legal analysis. To understand legal bilingualism as mere ‗textual duality', 55 for example, does violence to the concept, as it presumes that all law can be fully expressed through language, and that language itself can act as universal discourse. 56 Furthermore, using two languages in tandem adds a new level of precision and clarity even in the original language. This is part of a constant process of reconciliation between both languages in an attempt to transform each official text into its own contribution to the whole, rather than as a mere translation from a primus inter partes. This process also arguably allows those select language versions to shed their tendency to adapt to a national legal tradition, 57 which would mitigate some of the problems of using living languages for international legal discourse. 54 Rios (n 36) 214. 55 MacDonald, ‗Legal Bilingualism' (n 6) 128. 
Theories of Language and Communication
Language is inherently a tool for the communication of ideas and concepts. Already between two individuals, it is a challenge to employ the correct terms for the expression of such concepts-in many ways, all communication is the translation of thought into language.
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This also applies to legal language, which harbours its own particularised vocabulary and idioms. This problem is magnified in international legal circles, where the interaction between states requires also the interaction between these individual vocabularies. Some common ground must be chosen, yet it is difficult to speak those ideas in our native tongue, much less translate them on the international plane. That problem of translation goes well beyond linguistic concordance; it is rooted in a problem of vocabulary:
[L]e même terme peut être pris dans un sens différent en droit international et dans un droit constitutionnel déterminé. … Cette situation peut engendrer certaines confusions et l'idéal serait d'inventer, à l'usage du droit international, un vocabulaire propre. Mais cette voie qui a été suivie (par exemple en inventant sur le plan international des termes nouveaux et neutres comme ‗acceptation') ne peut garantir la séparation des deux vocabulaires, car au bout d'un certain temps, les règles nationales peuvent recourir à ce même vocabulaire en le déformant.
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It is true that legal culture in this regard depends not on ontological differences between legal orders, but instead on intellectual constructions; a common national legal culture springs from a shared history, intellectual heritage and cognitive structures more than on any inherent trait; this also means that there is a certain autonomy regarding legal culture as distinct from general culture. 60 Thus, as imperfect as shared communications are within a legal culture, there is a commonality which can be built upon. This imperfection grows in multi-cultural communities. Ideas, even under the best auspices, are not fully translatable into spoken or written; reliable multilingual accords are therefore even more difficult to reach, even when removing the problem of translation. The connotative aspects of language entail that words carry implied meanings, often associated with our cultural or national settings. What is indeed important throughout this interpretive process is the status of the interpreter, whether it is a specialised, administrative agency, or a body with objective, general jurisdiction called upon to interpret. The importance of courts and their particular interpretive process is explained by Paul Reuter as follows:
[O]n a parfois estimé que les cours de justice s'arrêtaient volontiers à des interprétations littérales, stabilisant le sens des mots au contenu qu'ils pouvaient avoir au moment de l'établissement des règles, retirant finalement aux termes à interpréter toute pertinence, puisque ceux-ci pour la conserver auraient dû suivre l'évolution des faits et de la science.
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The potential audience for international texts goes far beyond the restricted group of judges, lawyers, and legislators in national settings, and bears with it a much more cogent ‗universalist' pretension than the audience for national legal texts.
Furthermore, it is misplaced to speak of ‗clear texts': legal language, like all language, is laden with ambiguity, obscurity and indeterminacy. All these connotations of natural language continue to apply in legal settings, and therefore, any attempt at interpretation must consider all of these factors. It is one thing to interpret law; it is quite another to proceed with its application. 71 Moreover, as Georges Scelle argued, interpretation is inherent in legal thought and cannot be discarded even when a text is ‗clear':
Il ne faut pas confondre l'interprétation de la règle de droit avec son application. The importance of multilingualism in international law does not rest on maintaining cultural diversity, but rather, on the importance of accommodating legal pluralism within international legal discourse. There is far more at stake than cultural diversity and identity politics in ensuring that international law remains international. Besides the ‗loss of creativity in public international law … of approaches emanating from national legal orders to address legal problems', 77 there must be limitations on the continued moulding of international law to fit the vision of one particular legal order or group of legal orders. There is an indissoluble link between language and thought which makes consolidation into two languages poor, and one language a disastrous leap.
On a theoretical level, the form and substance inherent in understanding reality are lost by moving to one language. Understanding law through different languages and having them relate and interface with each other allows for diversity, be it cultural, intellectual or its interpretation occur in a multilingual context, one can perhaps better grasp the multiplicity of understandings that are lost in a uniformised linguistic setting. 78 In a system with the limited heritage but universalist pretensions of international law, these questions acquire heightened importance and consideration; and the multilingual prism, which avoids the elision between a legal norm and the texts of its expression, is perhaps the best method for its interpretation.
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